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Abstract In this studywe testwhether education spill-over effects biaseprivate
returns to education. We newly investigate for such effects within narrowly
defined occupational groups of a given firm using, going thus a step further
than earlier studies analysing such effects at employer level or within regions.
Using panel data from a Swiss employer-based labour force survey of 1996
we find clear empirical evidence for education spill-over effects on individual
wages (2%). This result proved to be robust against an alternative explanation
based on imperfect substitution between highly and less educated workers.
Consequently, conventionally calculated private returns to education are shown
to be biased upwards.
Keywords Workplace · Employer wage differentials · Human capital ·
Returns to education · Spillovers from education
JEL Classification D62 · J24 · J31
1 Introduction
Private returns to education measure the effect of an individual’s own educa-
tion on his or her wage. Conventionally calculated estimates of these returns,
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however, omit the fact that there may exist positive spill-over effects from one’s
own education to his/her co-workers’ wages. Indeed, if more highly educated
employees are working in a firm then there might be more opportunities for
low-skilled workers to learn from higher-skilled co-workers.
Such positive spill-over effects from co-worker’s education are particularly
important as more educated people tend to segregate themselves into firms and
jobs in which the average educational level is higher.1 The higher educated then
tend to benefit more from such human capital externalities. such positive exter-
nalities imply, then, that conventionally calculated private returns to education
are biased upwards.2
The implications of these externalities, i.e., that returns to education may not
be purely of a private nature, are the subject of analysis in a rather recent current
of labour market literature.3 So far, the evidence for such pecuniary education
spill-over effects is mainly based on a positive correlation between wages and
average education within regions or at the employer level. A clear identification
of such education spill-over effects, however, is difficult at such aggregated
levels. Such a positive correlation might just reflect other factors specific to this
regionor employer,which arepositively correlatedwith the average educational
level and which are difficult to control for. Taking the example of a firm, higher
wages might well just reflect higher technology intensity of production and not
be the result of higher incidence of knowledge transfer between co-workers
as suggested by the notion of education spill-over effects (e.g., Hamermesh
1993; Bresnahan et al. 2002). Similarly, higher wages within a human capital
intensive firm might reflect a wage policy aiming at minimising monitoring cost
as stipulated by the efficiency wage theory. External effects of education might
then be overestimated if any of these factors is omitted.
Therefore, in this study we go a step further than existing work, exploi-
ting the specific features of the Schweizerische Lohnstrukturerhebung, a Swiss
employer-based labour force survey. This data allows us to test for the impact
of co-workers’ education on an individual’s wage within narrowly defined occu-
pational groups of a given firm, after differencing out any confounding factor
at the firm level. This more precise test for education spill-over effects is the
1 See Kremer and Maskin (1996) for evidence from the USA, Britain and France, evidence for
Switzerland is given in Sect. 3.
2 Alternatively, larger positive externalities for higher educated persons may be considered as part
of the private education return. This additional return takes then the form of a better opportunity
to enter a firm with a highly educated workforce. In this case conventionally calculated private
returns to education mainly overestimate the true private returns for persons having obtained only
mandatory schooling. The overall effect for average educated is less clear while the the true returns
for the higher educated are underestimated. In this study, however, private returns are defined as
returns independent of co-workers’ education keeping to the tradition of of standard human capital
theory.
3 Battu et al. (2001) find an effect of 4–22% per average education within workplaces using survey
data for the UK. Barth (2000) finds an independent effect on own pay from the average level of
education within an establishment between 1 and 4% per year of average education using matched
employer–employee data from Norway.
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first aim of our study.4 Secondly, we investigate to what extent private returns
for education are affected when such education spill-over effects are controlled
for.
Looking at external effects of education within occupational groups exploits
the fact that they are a natural control for closeness, and hence the frequency of
professional interaction. Occupational closeness is also a measure for the com-
patibility of knowledge of co-workers, independently of the level of education.
As an example, a software engineer might learnmore from other software engi-
neers than from other high skilled employees working in the management of
the firm or the logistics department for instance, simply because they share the
same problems at work and maybe even their office space. Similarly, the advice
of such an engineer might also be demanded more frequently by a programmer
and his or her assistant than the advice of a co-worker from a different occupa-
tional group. Managers or lawyers will themselves learn more often from their
interactions with co-workers of their own occupational groups. This does not
exclude that software engineers might give them useful advice, but is assumed
to be less frequent. Hence, our main hypothesis is that employees working in
an occupational group with a higher average educational level than otherwise
identical employees will learn more working with them and thus earn higher
wages.
However, the impact of differing technologies or wage policy at the firm
level is not the only factor blurring the measurement of education spill-over
effects. Additional alternative explanations will be tested in this study. First,
unobserved heterogeneity of workers might bias the results. Hence, particular
emphasis will be given to controlling thoroughly for the quality of workers and
their education. Secondly, and even more importantly, imperfect substitution
between high and low skilled workers as suggested by a conventional demand
and supply model theoretically yields the same result for low skilled employees
as education spill-over effects.
Following the explanation of imperfect substitution, the marginal producti-
vity and hence the wage of the low skilled is a positive function of the number
of highly educated colleagues and vice versa. Strongly simplified, the secretarial
work done for a group of highly skilled engineers or the manager of a software
firm might have a higher impact on aggregate productivity than the identical
work done for a sales clerk working in a small supermarket where average edu-
cation is low. The secretary in the software firm will thus earn a higher salary
than the secretary of the sales clerk in the supermarket when working with a
higher educated co-workers, even though the work is the same. In this sense,
this effect is similar to the impact of a higher technology used in the firm on
the productivity of the employees. In the case of education spill-over effects, on
the contrary, there are learning effects of the employees assumed which should
increase the productivity of an individual for longer than his employment spell
4 The terms education spill-over effects, external effects of education and education externalities
are used as mutual equivalents throughout the paper. Likewise, the terms firm, establishment and
employer are used interchangeably.
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at this firm. A secretary or software assistant is assumed to learn more from
higher educated superiors in the software firm than when working in a super-
market.
In order to discriminate between these two explanations, we estimate the
impact of co-workers’ education on an individual’s wage education for different
educational levels. If a positive impact is found for the highly educated workers
and not only for the less educated, we reject the explanation based on imperfect
substitution but take the result as evidence for education spill-over effects.
Knowing whether there are education spill-over effects is important at many
levels. First, the answer to this questions is important for an individual’s educa-
tion decision. If due to these spill-over effects the return to an additional year
of education is lower than previously assumed and individuals are aware of
it, they might prefer to invest their energy directly in searching a job within a
human capital intensive working environment than increasing their education.
More generally, if such education externalities exist, they can reasonably be
assumed to affect a great variety of labour market processes, like the job search
of individuals or the success of in-house training for instance, emphasising the
need for micoeconomic theory to take them into account.
But knowing more about education spill-over effects will be equally impor-
tant for economic policy. First, it would clearly strengthen the case for public
subsidies for private education, as it is a well established fact that competitive
markets underproduce in the presence of a positive externality (e.g., Hazlett
2000). Second, upgrading workers’ skills in order to provide them with more
flexibility in the labour market is an important aim of public policy given the
changing structure of labour demand and high levels of unemployment. But
upgrading workers’ skills with formal education programs has generally proved
rather difficult for workers with low educational levels. Hence, the concept of
external effects of education would strengthen the case for public policy mea-
sures aiming at upgrading workers within the labour market, thus highlighting
the need for empirical evidence in this field.
The rest of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a more detailed
overview on the relevant literature, in Sect. 3 the data used are described, in
Sect. 4 the methodology and specification are detailed, in Sect. 5 the results are
presented, and Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The contribution of an individual’s education to his/her income is a thoroughly
discussed subject. The economic theory at themicro levelwas largely dominated
by JacobMincer’s (1974) formulation of the log-linear wage-education relation-
ship. Estimation of this model using an identical data specification show that
each additional year of schooling of a given individual appears to raise wage
earnings by 5–15% (e.g. Card 1999; Harmon et al. 2001). Critics of Mincer’s
model concentrated on possible selectivity problems due to differences in abi-
lity and time preferences (discount rates) of individuals of different educational
Private returns to education versus education spill-over effects 319
levels. In principle, such omitted variables (e.g., inherent ability) could cause
simple OLS estimates of wage equations to significantly overstate the return
to education. But, surprisingly, little empirical evidence was found to support
this view, leading to the conclusion that Mincer’s standard model fits the data
rather well.5 However, this micro human capital literature completely ignored
possible education spill-over effects on individual earnings.
The literature about external effects of education is sizeable. On the one
hand, non-market externalities of schooling are shown to be substantial by
Wolfe and Zuvekas (1995), among others. On the other hand, and more related
to the pecuniary benefits of education, there is a second strand of literature, the
recent neoclassical growth literature, which takes human capital explicitly into
account, as in the work of Lucas (1988) andRomer (1990). The impact of educa-
tion on income is modelled not only as an independent factor of production but
also as a factor having an additional impact on the aggregate level. Nevertheless,
finding robust empirical evidence for the positive impact of the level (externali-
ties) and variation (factor input) of educationon theper capita incomegrowthof
a country is amore challenging task, especially asmeasurement of education is a
serious problem. Krueger and Lindahl (2000), for instance, review such models
and problems associated with their estimation.6 But their own estimations show
that returns to schooling in cross-country models are indeed larger than those
found using micro-level regressions, suggesting possible aggregate spill-over
effects from higher educational levels. Moretti (2004a,b) finds robust evidence
for significant education spill-over effects within cities in the USA. More pre-
cisely, Moretti (2004a) finds that a percentage point increase in the supply of
college graduates raises high school drop-outs’ wages by 1.9%, high school gra-
duates’ wages by 1.6%, and college graduates wages by 0.4%.Arguing correctly
that imperfect substitution between high and low skilled workers as suggested
by a conventional demand and supplymodel theoretically yields the same result
for low skilled employees as education spill-over effects, he concludes that only
the impact on the college graduates can be taken as evidence for such effects.
Acemoglu and Angrist (1999), to the contrary, find little evidence for sizeable
external returns to education when exploiting an exogenous variation in the
length of compulsory schooling in US states. Arvanitis (1999), using data for
Switzerland at the firm level, shows empirical evidence for a direct impact of
human capital in related industries on the value added of a firm. It is, however,
difficult to separate causal effects of education in such aggregated data, a fact
also stressed by the authors of the above studies.
5 Available micro evidence as summarised by Card (1999) and Harmon et al. (2003) is suggesting
that the return to an additional year of education obtained for exogenous reasons like an increase
of the compulsory years of schooling is more likely to be greater, not lower, than the conventionally
estimated return to schooling. This result supports the idea that less educated individuals have a
higher time preference (discount rates) than high educated individuals.
6 For high technology industries an indirect causal link between human capital formation and
productivity through the impact on research and innovation is empirically better documented, see
Zucker et al. (1998) and Jaffe et al. (1993).
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The literature, so far, has produced very few studies looking at evidence
for education spill-over effects at the employee level, although measurement
problems may be reduced with decreasing levels of aggregation. To date,
such attempts concentrated on such effects at the employer level, finding a
significant impact of average education on an individual’s wage. Barth (2000)
argues, for example, that external effects generally materialise through the lear-
ning/teaching process or through the organisational skills of the better educated
co-workers.7 Similarly to Barth (2000), Destré et al. (2001) also emphasise the
learning/teaching channel, finding positive wage effects of the learning poten-
tial, proxied by co-workers’ education and their tenure within firms. Battu
et al. (2001) follow the idea, as suggested by Kremer (1993), that different edu-
cational levels measure skill incompatibility rather than skill complementarity.
Based on this idea, they investigate whether education spill-over effects arise
mainly within similar skill levels. Their results, nevertheless, do not confirm this
hypothesis, and they conclude that education spill-over effects tend to materia-
lise in a multidimensional way between workers of different educational levels
above the mandatory schooling threshold.8
One general shortcoming of all these studies is that the precise identification
of education spill-over effects at firm level is difficult due to various confoun-
ding factors. The observed correlation between average education within a firm
and an individual’s wagemay just reflect other employer specific factors, such as
differences in wage policy or the internal organisation structure of the firm. Effi-
ciency wage policy aiming at minimising monitoring costs, for instance, could
reasonably be assumed to be positively correlated with the share of high skilled
employees, if monitoring costs increase with the complexity of work. Similarly,
differences in the degree of introducing labour organisation flexibility and the-
reby gradually abandoning a Taylorist organisation, as suggested by Lindbeck
and Snower (2000), may lead to differences in wage policies of firms. Further-
more, the physical capital or technology intensity chosen by the employer may
also be positively correlated with the human capital intensity and the wage level
of the firm. Finally, and of equal importance, imperfect substitution between
high and low skilled workers as suggested by a conventional demand and supply
model theoretically yield the same result for low skilled employees as educa-
tion spill-over effects. In short, external effects of education might indeed be
7 It is important to note that these results are based on the assumption that some rent-sharing
takes place in the labour market for workers to benefit from the productivity gain of the higher
human capital of their co-workers. Otherwise, following the assumption of a competitive labour
market without information and search cost, workers with low skilled co-workers would want to
work with highly educated co-workers for any wage higher than their present wage and firms would
prefer to employ them at any rate lower than their presently offered wages.
8 In a subsequent study restricted to two service sectors in the UK, Battu et al. (2004) found again
robust evidence for education spill-overs effects at the workplace. However, the hypothesis of a
complementary relationship between co-workers’ human capital as suggested by Kremer (1993)
was not confirmed by their results. Similarly, external effects for training were tested, but could not
be found in this restricted sample.
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overestimated if there are any omitted factors which are positively correlated
with the educational level of employees.
The problem of firm heterogeneity has been addressed in earlier research in
diverse ways. In Barth’s study, the robustness of the results for capital intensity
was tested, as the literature suggests a complementary relationship between
these two factors of production. Battu et al. (2001) control for labour propor-
tions of operating costs for similar reasons and for teamwork as a measure for
the interaction intensity of co-workers working for the same employer, while
Destré et al. (2001) control for the existence of an explicit wage policy. Despite
the apparent need for controlling for such factors, the diversity and contingency
of the factors included clearly highlight the importance of this identification
problem at the firm level. Battu et al. (2001); Battu et al. (2004), indeed, ack-
nowledge the need for looking at education spill-over effects on workers of the
same team. Hence, none of these studies looks at spill-over effects of education
at a more disaggregated level within the firm, thus controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity of employers, industries and regions. Moreover, none of these
studies analysing education spill-over at the employer level tested whether
their measure of external effects of education did not merely reflect the impact
of imperfect substitution between workers of different skills on the earnings of
the lower skilled.
3 The methodology
As in the previous study the framework of analysis is given by Mincer’s (1974)
wage equation:
wij = Xijβols + ij, (1)
where i = 1, . . . ,N and j = 1, . . . , J indices for individuals andfirms, respectively.
wij is the natural logarithm of hourly wages. Xij is a vector of standard wage
relevant individual characteristics: age, tenure, dummies for part-time work,
foreign nationality, service sector activity, and, in particular, number of years
of education (Eij). βols is the corresponding vector of coefficients including
the coefficient of the education variable, measuring conventionally calculated
private returns to education, βEols. The error term, ij, is i.i.d. with mean zero and
variance σ 2.
As mentionned at the beginning of Sect. 2 Mincer’s model is strongly criti-
cised for its failure to take into account an eventual selectivity bias due to the
schooling decision of an individual. If schooling is not random but endogenous
then the error term, ij, capturing unobserved individual characteristics is cor-
related with the number of years of education (Eij). Following the idea that
more able individual choose to obtain higher education more frequently than
less able individuals, this correlation is expected to be positive and conventio-
nally calculated private returns to education, βEols, are overestimated. However,
differences in time preferences may act as a contradicting influence. It may
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be that less educated individuals choose to leave school and enter the labour
market at an earlier age than the higher educated because they have a signi-
ficantly higher preference for present as compared to future consumption. In
this case the correlation between the error term, ij, and the number of years of
education (Eij) is negative. Conventionally calculated private returns to educa-
tion, βEols, are then underestimated. Hence, ideally the Mincer’s wage equation
should be enlarged in order to take into account of these conflicting influences.
This is, however, beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, the data set used
is lacking appropriate information concerning ability or time preference of
individuals approximated frequently by family background variables. This pro-
blem is mitigated somewhat by the fact that empirical evidence is available for
both explanations leading finally to the conclusion that Mincer’s wage equation
fits the data rather well. Hence, although individual heterogeneity can not be
controlled for throughly, Mincer’s age equation is taken as a starting point.
We can, however, control for employer heterogeneity as a representative
sample of employees is available for any firm in the data set. For that the wage
equation (1) is generally enlarged by firm-specific variables not directly related
to human capital, Zj, like size, region and industry of the firm. In addition,
weighted least squares estimation (wls) is used, due to the survey design. Our
first model (Model 1) will thus be the following:
wij = Xijβwls + Zjηwls + ij, (2)
where the estimate of private returns to education is, thus, measured by βEwls,
the coefficient of the education variable in this equation.
Model 1 as a point of reference assumes that there are no external effects
of education. Hence, an individual’s wage depends only on his or her own
individual education, βEwls, being indeed the true measure of private returns to
education.
Against this reference model we will test in a first stepModel 2 where educa-
tion spill-over effects within firms (Model 2) independent of occupational groups
are assumed. For that we add controls for co-workers’ education at the same
firm but not within the same occupational group.We follow in that Barth (2000)
and Battu et al. (2001). This will be done using a 2-step formulation of this wage
equation following the spirit of the literature of inter-firm wage differentials
introduced by Groshen (1991) and Abowd et al. (1999). First, it allows simul-
taneously and in an elegant way to control for the cluster structure of the data
introducedby the two-stage sample survey design, seePeffermann andLaVange
(1989) for a detailed discussion.9 Second, this method has the advantage of dif-
ferencing out any employer-specific factor. Using in addition robust estimation
techniques like the Hubert-White sandwich estimator for the standard errors
makes sure to take into account any remaining heteroscedasticity linked to firm
9 Using appropriateweighting and clustering options, a 1-stepwage estimation including individual
(within-differences and averages) and firm characteristics were tested to give the same results,
available from the author upon request.
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size or industry affiliation. This will be important in a subsequent step when
estimating the impact of co-workers education at occupational group.
More precisely, the Mincer wage equation is augmented to account for firm
level fixed effects, as follows:
wij =
J∑
j=1
Dijγj + Xijβw + ij, (3)
where Dij is a vector of dummy-variables indicating whether individual i works
in firm j, and γj is the corresponding firm fixed effect. Equation (3) can be
estimated by OLS which is equivalent to a regression of the deviation of each
individual’s log wage and X variables from their respective firm-specific means
(e.g., Greene 1997, pp. 615–619). For technical reasons the second procedure is
chosen. Furthermore, this method allows give an unbiased estimate of the firm
fixed effect γj. For a consistent estimation of γj, however, a large number of
observations for any given firm is required. Moreover, it is important to note
that the resulting vector of coefficients βw utilises the within-firm variation only.
The education spill-over effects within firms is then foundwhen analysing the
fixed effect γj which in fact measures the firm’s pay premium. More precisely,
the fixed effect γj is then expressed as a function of the firm-specific means
of the explanatory variables of the wage equation, X¯j, including the average
number of years of education Ej and other firm-specific variables, Zj, like size,
region and industry of the firm.
γj = X¯jδ + Zjη + vj, (4)
δ and η are the coefficient vectors to be estimated, including δE, the coefficient
of average education at the firm, measuring the education spill-over effects at
firm level we are intersted in. The error term, vj, has expected value zero and
variance σ 2v . Moreover, vj is independently distributed of the right-hand-side
variables, X¯j andZj. The error terms, , in Eq. (3) have also expected value zero,
but are heteroscedastic with variance σ 2v /nj, nj being the number of individuals
working for firm j. In principle, the vector of coefficients δ and η could result
from estimating Eq. (4). For the sake of computational simplicity, however, we
calculate the between- and the within-firm estimators and estimate the vector of
coefficients δ which we are interested in by subtracting the second from the first.
Since the within- and between-firm variations are orthogonal and since both are
uncorrelated with the respectiveX-variables, the variance of δ is simply the sum
of the variances of βw and βb. See Wirz (2005) for a more detailed discussion.
Model 2 thus assumes that education spill-over effects arise at the firm level
only. Hence, δE is expected to be statistically significantly different from zero.
The resulting βEw is then the true measure of private returns to education cor-
rected for spill-over effects at the firm level.
In a third step a new andmore restrictive test is done withModel 3, where we
allow for education spill-overs to take their effect within the occupational group
over and above their effect at the firm level. If there is evidence found for such
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effects atmore disaggregate level, we conclude that external effects of education
indeed exist. In order to test that, the variable ECWioj is added to the vector of
wage relevant individual characteristics (Xij) as described in Model 2. ECWioj
is the level of education of co-workers within the same occupational group o of
individual i in firm j and is therefore the main variable of interest. To be precise,
when speaking of co-workers of the same occupational group, only co-workers
of the same firm are included.Workers of the same occupational group working
in different firms are described as by “employees of the same occupational
group”. βw is the corresponding vector of coefficients including βECWw which
measures finally the education spill-over effects within occupational group we
want to test. The estimation procedure is identical to the one decribed for
Model 2.
Model 3 finally assumes that education spill-over effects arise at the firm
level and within occupational groups. Hence, δE and βECWw are expected to be
statistically significantly different from zero. Moreover, the resulting βEw is then
the true measure of private returns to education corrected for spill-over effects
at both levels.
All three models will be estimated in two specifications. Model 1b, 2b, 3b
assume an identical wage structure for both gender. Whereas, Model 1a, 2a, 3a
allow the wage structure of men and women to differ with respect to the slope
coefficients. As an exception to that, co-workers’ years of education and the
dummy for no-coworker in occupational group are not interacted with gender
for the sake of simplicity. Similarly, the firm effects are constrained to be equal
between men and women.
Tests for alternative explanations, e.g. unobserved individual heterogeneity
or imperfect substitution between high and low skilled workers, will be done
withModel 3 using information on education, tenure and detailed occupational
classification.
Finally, if robust evidence is found for such education externalities, we expect
the estimate of private return to education corrected for these spill-overs, βEw , to
be lower than conventional estimates, βEwls. Due to the fact that the segregation
of highly educated workers into human capital intensive firms paying higher
wages might be considered a part of the returns to individual education, this
estimate should tend to be a lower bound. But in any case, the comparison
between βEwls and β
E
w gives a first indication of the importance of the bias arising
if external effects are ignored.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
Data structure This study uses linked employer-employee data from for the
year 1996 from the Schweizerische Lohnstrukturerhebung (LSE). The LSE is
a biannual employer-based survey conducted by the Bundesamt für Statistik
(BFS), the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, in order to monitor the level and
structure of wages in Switzerland.10 This data represent a 10% sample of esta-
10 See also Wirz (2005).
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blishments in Switzerland stratified by industries and size classes and gives
detailed information on workers’ compensation, jobs, and firm characteris-
tics.11,12 Small firms in the survey have to report on all their employees, while
large firms report only on a part of their workforce. This implies that LSE is
representative at the job-level. As many firms choose to give information about
a larger share of employees than indicated by the survey design initially, these
survey weights have to be taken into account in summary statistics representing
the total employed workforce.
In this study the terms firm and establishment are used asmutual equivalents.
It is important to note, however, that within this terminology two separate firms
may belong to a same unknown company. Still, a given firm may have several
geographical locations or outlets of its business. For the purpose of our analysis
we define firms having their business locations within only one of the seven
regions. This is based on the assumption that outlets of the same firm working
in the same region do share some centralised services like training, technical
support and the like. Put differently, we assume that there is interaction between
the employees of a given firm working in the same region. By redefining the
firms in that way the number of firms increases somewhat. The estimation
method applied differences as described in Sect. 3 controls thoroughly for
heteroscedasticity due to enployer characteristics (industry, region, groups of
firms) and any clustering of data at firm or higher aggregation levels.
Sample definition To increase the homogeneity of the firm and employee data
sample we restrict our sub-sample to the private sector and consider only firms
with at least six observations. For the same reasons some industries/sectors, such
as agriculture, forestry and related services, other mining and quarrying, health
and social work, and private sector educational facilities were excluded. These
are small industries, where the number of observations was too limited to yield
reliable results. This restricts our sample to 6,753 firms and 408,008 employees.
Descriptive statistics of total sample A look at the first two columns of Table 1
indicates the characteristics of this representative sample of the employedwork-
force in Switzerland. Employees have on average 12 years of education, are
around 40 years old and two-thirds of employees work in service sector related
occupations.13 Overall, this is not surprising for a highly developed country.
But, rather high in international comparison are the share of employees with
foreign nationalities (0.31) and the share of part-time workers (0.21). The for-
mer is due to high immigration as well as a restrictive naturalisation policy.14
11 The LSE reports standardized gross hourly wage rates not accounting for possible overtime pay.
12 Register data (BUR, Schweizerisches Betriebs- und Unternehmensregister).
13 The LSE does the highest level of completed education rather than years of schooling, see
Weber et al. (2001) for a description of the Swiss educational system. Based on the work of Weber
(1998) average years of schooling applying to each education level by gender are approximated,
see Table 10 in the Appendix for details.
14 Most foreigners have a Swiss education certificate, indicating that they grew up in Switzerland.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics by human capital intensity of the firm
Mean SD Subsamples
Average years of education (Ej) in firm
10.5–11.5 11.5–12.5 12.5–13.5
Mean Mean Mean
Hourly wage rate 30.63 12.32 26.42 30.40 33.91
Hourly wage rate (log) 3.36 0.26 3.22 3.37 3.48
Firm fixed effect (log) 0.00 0.19 −0.06 0.00 0.05
Employee’s years of education 12.10 1.32 11.02 12.10 12.84
Education information missing, share 0.20 – 0.15 0.16 0.21
Age 39.41 5.12 39.94 39.62 36.64
Tenure 8.92 4.31 8.90 9.21 9.36
Service occupation, share 0.59 – 0.51 0.56 0.61
Occupation information missing, share 0.11 – 0.01 0.16 0.08
Non-Swiss nationality, share 0.31 – 0.42 0.26 0.21
Part-time, share 0.21 – 0.22 0.20 0.16
Women, share 0.36 – 0.40 0.36 0.28
Co-workers’ years of education 10.42 2.93 9.94 10.33 11.16
in occupational group, average
No co-workers, share 0.10 – 0.08 0.12 0.11
Firm size (log) 3.84 3.85 4.03 3.54 4.06
Firm size information missing, share 0.04 – 0.04 0.06 0.05
Number of observations (firms) 6,753 1,129 2,268 1,558
Data weighted by the number of observations within the firm and the survey inclusion probability
Source: LSE(1996)
The latter is due to a combination of a high labour market participation rate of
women, high number of working hours of standard labour contracts, and rather
unfavourable institutional arrangements concerning child care and maternity
leave in Switzerland (similar to Anglo-Saxon countries like the USA or the
UK). These factors, reflecting the heterogeneity of the labour force, are taken
into account in our model specifications. As a general characteristic of the Swiss
labour market, unions are rather weak, membership and coverage are low, and
employment protection measures are not very far-reaching. Despite this fact,
Switzerland has low and rather stable wage inequality similar to other conti-
nental European countries, explaining why conventionally measured private
returns (7%) are at the lower bound in international comparisons, as we will
see in Sect. 5.
Descriptive statistics by human capital intensity of the firm The next three
columns in Table 1 show the same worker and firm characteristics by increa-
sing human capital intensity of the firm. This is measured by the variable
average years of education of the firm. The ranges of this variable for the
low, medium, and high human capital intensity categories are 10.5–11.5, 11.5–
12.5, and 12.5–13.5 years, respectively. The employer wage premia vary bet-
ween −0.06 and 0.05 log points over this range of employers and highlight the
large wage impact of the human capital intensity of the firm, confirming earlier
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studies. The employer wage premia result from a fixed effect wage equation,
and hence are corrected for human capital characteristics of the individual
employees. For most of the remaining characteristics the differences are small.
Generally employees in firms with high human capital intensity tend to be a few
years younger, have slightly more tenure besides being better educated. Fur-
thermore, Swiss citizens and male employees are overrepresented in these high
wage firms. Logically, the average educational level of the co-workers within
the same occupational group increases with the average educational level of
the firm. Finally, it is interesting to see that firm size does not appear to be
correlated with the human capital intensity of the firm.
Human capital intensity of occupational groupsTable 2 lists the 24 occupational
groups as defined in the LSEwhich will allow us to determine the wage effect of
co-workers’ education within occupational groups, the main focus of this study.
As shown by the mean and the standard deviation of the employees years of
education by occupational group, all skill levels of jobs and hence employees
of all educational levels are found within most of these groups.15,16 This allows
for sufficient variation in co-workers’ education at the occupational level.
Employees without co-workers in their group Particular care will be given to
the treatment of employees working alone in their occupational group. These
individuals tend to have higher educational levels than comparable employees
with co-workers working in a different firm. This becomes visible in Table 1,
where co-workers’ education within an occupational group is shown to be lower
(1–2 years) than the aggregate education at the firm level.
However, the share of such individuals working in isolation is quite uni-
form across all human capital intensity levels at around 10% of the employees
(Table 1). There is more variation of the share of these individuals across occu-
pational groups as shown in the last column of Table 2, although this share
is mostly lower than 0.10. Exceptions are the occupational groups related to
the management of the firm, its administrative tasks (groups 20, 21, 22, 24).
This probably reflects the fact that in small firms only one person is in charge of
these key tasks. This gives the overall impression that, albeit not important as its
share within the sample, such a ‘solitary status’ within their occupational groups
might hide a non-random selection process. A precise analysis of the selection
process into such “solitary status” or alternatively into jobs with co-workers in
the same occupational group is contingent on a more comprehensive data set
than the LSE. In particular, a variable explaining this selection but which is not
correlated with wages is lacking. Consequently, endogenizing or instrumenting
such a selection process in a statistical and economically reliable way is not
possible.
15 Employers indicate the required skill level of job in a variable which takes values from 1 to 4
on a discrete scale.
16 An exception is group 20 ‘Goal setting and defining of firm strategy’, which is rated as requiring
the highest skill level in a job.
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Table 2 Education years by occupational groups
Occupational Number of Employees’ years of No. co-workers
group (OG) employees education in OG in OG
Mean SD Share
10 Manufacturing and processing of
products
62,629 11.1 1.82 0.015
11 Construction sector activities 11,815 11.7 1.71 0.013
12 Installation, operation, and
maintenance of machinery and
equipment
23,348 11.9 1.57 0.080
13 Restoration, craftsman’s work 366 11.3 1.74 0.114
20 Goal setting and defining of firm
strategy
6,409 14.6 2.12 0.462
21 Accounting and human resource
management
12,780 12.8 1.66 0.386
22 Secretarial and administrative
work
19,743 12.2 1.34 0.241
23 Other commercial, administra-
tive work
28,264 12.3 1.63 0.155
24 Logistics, general management
support
9,636 13.0 2.20 0.214
25 Assessment, consulting, authen-
tication
19,594 13.7 2.28 0.073
26 Purchasing/sale of raw materials
and investment goods
5,964 13.1 1.71 0.151
27 Sale of consumption goods and
services
60,210 11.7 1.61 0.031
28 Research 9,224 14.9 2.56 0.090
29 Analysing, programming, opera-
ting
11,130 13.7 2.22 0.103
30 Planing, engineering, technical
drawing, designing
11,955 13.8 1.87 0.110
31 Transportation of persons, goods
and services
23,902 11.0 1.76 0.068
32 Security and protection services 1,869 12.2 1.72 0.064
33 Medical, care taking, and social
work activities
626 13.2 2.25 0.086
34 Personal hygiene and clothes
maintenance
1,214 11.7 1.23 0.048
35 Cleaning and public hygiene ser-
vices
6,026 10.0 1.49 0.219
36 Pedagogical services 1,581 13.4 2.74 0.151
37 Catering and housekeeping ser-
vices
16,997 10.8 1.82 0.013
38 Culture, information, entertain-
ment, sport and free-time activi-
ties
2,383 13.2 2.44 0.040
40 Other activities 13,676 11.9 2.28 0.088
0 Missing information 46,667 12.1 2.14 0.007
Data weighted by the survey inclusion probability. Standard deviation are calculated within the
occupational group of the total sample
Source: LSE(1996)
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Table 3 Co-workers’ education by education level of the employee
Aggregate education Average education No co-workers Number of
classification years of co-workers (share of employees) employees
in firm in OG
Tertiary education level 13.4 14.6 0.152 28,555
Upper secondary level 12.6 13.0 0.169 28,924
Vocational education 12.1 12.2 0.111 173,953
Mandatory schooling and
on the job training
11.3 10.6 0.048 93,128
Foreign education, MEI 13.1 11.7 0.028 83,448
Total number of observations
(employees)
408,008
OG occupational group. Data weighted by the survey inclusion probability. Tertiary education level
includes university and tertiary education of the vocational education system. Upper secondary
level includes upper secondary education of vocational and non-vocational education system and
teacher education.Vocational education is a professional education certificate, recognized as federal
degree.On the job training is vocational educationwhich is not recognized as federal degree. Foreign
education is a non-Swiss education degree. MEI missing education information. See Tables 9 and
10 in the Appendix for a detailed overview
Source: LSE(1996)
Because of this we restrict the analysis of education spill-over effects within
occupational groups to employees having co-workers and we do not compare
them to individuals working alone in their occupational group. We do this
by creating first a dummy variable, DCOW, indicating that the individual has
‘co-workers’ and interacting it with co-workers’ education at the occupational
group level. Second we add a variable (DNCOW=1−DCOW) for individuals
‘without co-workers’ in the same occupational group in the wage regressions.
Variables with missing information Missing information on education, occupa-
tion and firm size is taken into account using additional dummies, in the same
way as we did for these individuals working in isolation, in order to keep the
sample as large as possible. For the remaining variables, such missing informa-
tion concerns only a few observations which are excluded. However, this lack
of information is of particular importance to the education variable. Part of it
is due to the fact that some foreign workers have (foreign) education that does
not fit into the Swiss classification system. This is coded as missing. Rather than
excluding these observations from the sample we treat individuals with missing
observations on education as a separate education category (MEI). Overall the
group with missing information on education is comparable to the other groups
except for slightly lower wages and a little higher tenure. Nevertheless, this
problem could affect the measure of co-workers’ education within occupatio-
nal group. In order to increase the reliability of this measure, this variable is
defined to be missing if education information is available for only 20% or less
of co-workers within the same educational group.
Educational segregation by firm and occupational groups Table 3 shows the
average number of years of education of co-workers within the firm and within
330 A. M. Wirz
the occupational group (of the same firm) by aggregate educational level of
the individual, see Table 11 in the Appendix for a precise definition. This
gives a measure of the segregation by skill levels. Such educational segrega-
tion is even higher across occupational groups (second column) than across
employers (first column). University graduates’ co-workers have on average
two years more education than co-workers of employees having followed only
mandatory schooling. But, university graduates’ co-workers within the same
occupational group have even four more years of education than the corres-
ponding co-workers of the lowest skilled. Employees without co-workers in the
same occupational groups are mainly medium or high skilled (share between
0.11 and 0.17), and less often low skilled (0.05).
Overall, this first look at the data confirms the positive correlation of edu-
cation with the employer wage premia and the strong segregation pattern of
employees with different human capital across employers and occupational
groups.
5 Results
5.1 Education spill-over effects within firms
5.1.1 Basic model
The results of the estimation ofModel 1a in the first column of Table 4 show that
the conventionally calculated private return to an additional year of education,
βwls, amounts to 0.071 log points in our overall sample. For detailed results
of this equation see Table 9 in the Appendix. As differences in log wages
indicate approximately relative differences this is equivalent to around 7%.This
simplification will be used throughout the study. In Model 1b, which allows the
wage structure to vary by gender, we find an almost identical estimate of around
0.072 log points for men, and a slightly lower estimate for women (0.067 log
points). These results are at the lower bound of the private returns to education
found for Switzerland in earlier studies as shown by Weber et al. (2001). This
should be due to the more extensive specification of the wage equation.
In a second stepwe estimateModel 2a assuming now that education spill-over
effects arise within firms. The results presented in the third column of Table 4
show that the coefficient δE, measuring these spill-over effects, amounts to 0.022
log points (or around 2%). The corrected private return to education, βEw , are at
0.060 log points or 6% around one percentage point lower than conventional
returns. Introducing gender effects into the wage structure in Model 2b, the
results are not altered noticeably (fourth column), the corrected return for
women (0.053 log points) are also slightly lower than for men (0.063 log points).
The quality of fit for these models, measured by the relevantR-square is around
50%, a very satisfactory fit for a cross-sectional wage equation estimation. The
assumption of equality of employer-specific fixed effects is clearly rejected,
based on the F-test statistic above 30.
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Table 4 Education spill-over effects within firms
Estimation model: 1a 1b 2a 2b
Dependent variable: log hourly wage WLS WLS W/B W/B
Employee’s years of education:
Both gender 0.071 – 0.060 –
(0.001)∗∗ – (0.000)∗∗ –
Men – 0.072 – 0.063
– (0.001)∗∗ – (0.000)∗∗
Women – 0.067 – 0.053
– (0.001)∗∗ – (0.000)∗∗
Average years of education in firm:
Both gender – – 0.022 –
– – (0.002)∗∗ –
Men – – – 0.022
– – – (0.003)∗∗
Women – – – 0.022
– – – (0.004)∗∗
Number of observations (employees) 408,008 408,008 408,008 408,008
Number of observations (firms) – – 6,753 6,756
R–squared (standard) 0.526 0.535 – –
R–squared (within) – – 0.469 0.487
F–test for firm fixed–effects – – 34.9 35.5
Coefficients denoted by ** are significant at 1% level. WLS shows the result from weighted least
squares estimation. W/B indicates within and between estimation results from two-step estimation
described in Sect. 3
Both estimation models include furthermore as individual variables: age, age squared, tenure,
tenure squared, dummies for service or unclassified occupation, foreigner, women, part-time wor-
kers, additional dummies for individuals with missing information and for individuals with missing
information for their own or co-workers’ education or their activity and firm level controls for seven
regions, seven industries and firm size. In Model 1a and 2a the wage structure of men and women is
supposed identical but differs in Model 1b and 2b. The firm effects, however, are always restricted
to be equal between men and women (Models 2a and 2b)
Source: LSE(1996)
These results confirm the findings fromprevious studies about private returns
to education and the positive correlation between average education at the firm
level and the employerwage premia. For Switzerland, this was shownpreviously
byRamirez (2000) andWirz (2005). The estimate for education spill-over effects
at firm level for Switzerland is at around the lower bound of the results for
Norway (between 2 and 6%), but it is much lower than the estimates found for
the UK (between 4 and 22%). For Switzerland the private return to education
decreases substantially when corrected for external effects of education, by
around one percentage point to 6% for both genders taken together.
5.2 Education spill-over effects within occupational groups
5.2.1 Basic model
A new and more restrictive test for external effects of education is develo-
ped in this study by analysing the correlation between wages and co-workers’
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Table 5 Education spill-over effects within firms and occupational groups
Estimation model: 3a 3b
Dependent variable: log hourly wage W/B W/B
Employee’s years of education:
Both gender 0.052∗∗ –
(0.000) –
Men – 0.054∗∗
– (0.000)
Women – 0.046∗∗
– (0.000)
Co-workers’ years of education in occupational 0.041∗∗ 0.040∗∗
group, average (0.000) (0.000)
No. co-workers in occupational group, dummy 0.604∗∗ 0.588∗∗
(0.000) (0.006)
Average years of education in firm:
Both gender 0.020∗∗ –
(0.005) –
Men – 0.021∗∗
– (0.005)
Women – 0.019∗∗
– (0.006)
Number of observations (employees) 408,008 408,008
Number of observations (firms) 6,753 67,53
R-squared (within) 0.482 0.499
R-squared (between) 0.550 0.557
F-test for firm fixed-effects 30.7 31.1
Coefficients denoted by ** are significant at 1% level.W/B indicates within and between estimation
results from two-step estimation described in Sect. 3
Both estimation models include furthermore as individual variables: age, age squared, tenure,
tenure squared, dummies for service or unclassified occupation, foreigner, women, part-time wor-
kers, additional dummies for individuals with missing information and for individuals with missing
information for their own or co-workers’ education or their activity and firm level controls for seven
regions, seven industries and firm size
In Model 3a the wage structure of men and women is supposed identical but differs in Model 3b.
In both models, however, the firm effects are restricted to be equal between men and women
Source: LSE(1996)
education within clusters of occupational groups at a given firm (Model 3). As
discussed in Sect. 4, this measure has the advantage of not being affected by
employer-specific effects. Theoretically, it can be argued that these additional
education spill-over effects arise because workers within the same occupatio-
nal group have a higher interaction frequency. With increasing closeness in
professional activity the potential for learning from co-workers may also be
higher.
The results in Table 5 show that there are indeed education spill-over effects
within occupational groups over and above their effects at the firm level. More
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impressively, the effects within occupational groups (0.041 log points or around
4%) are twice the size of the effects at firm level (0.020 log points or around
2%). Introducing a gender-specific wage structure as in Model 3b displays a
similar picture.
The coefficient of the dummy for no-coworkers in the occupational group
confirms our a priori expectation that such individuals working in isolation are
not a randomly chosen subsample of employees but clearly earn above average
wages. This wage premia is, however, overestimated by the coefficient 0.604, as
the impact of co-workers’ average education years within occupational groups
(10.42×0.041=0.427) has to be taken into account. This impact is differenced
out in the estimation of the co-workers’ education years coefficient. Hence, the
true wage premia of these individuals working in isolation is thus the difference
between the average and the estimated coefficient which amounts to 0.177
log points (=0.604−0.427). Intuitively, it seems indeed reasonable to expect
that individuals with additional unmeasured qualifications such as professional
training or a highdegree of self-confidence and independent thinking are chosen
for such autonomous positions. But in addition to that, the overrepresentation
of employees of occupational groups related to the management of the firm
in this subsample mentioned earlier should explain a large share of this wage
premia.
Despite the fact that a formal causal relationship regarding a positive spill-
over effect of one’s co-workers’ education on his/herwage cannot be established
with this data, these findings clearly strengthen the case for the external effects
of education. This, in addition, confirms the a priori expectation that closeness
in professional activity matters for such effects. The estimate of an individual’s
private return to education corrected for education spill-over effects at firm
and occupational group level amounts to 0.052 log points or around 5% for the
total sample (0.054 log points for men and 0.046 log points for women). This
estimate is about two percentage points lower than the conventional estimates
of private returns to education.
5.2.2 Unobserved worker and education heterogeneity
So far, our estimates of external effects of education are based on the hypothe-
sis of workers being homogenous in unobserved characteristics and that there
is no systematic sorting of individuals within firms determined by unmeasured
characteristics. In order to evaluate the impact of such unobserved heteroge-
neity as far as possible we perform several robustness tests in the following
subsections using information on education, tenure and detailed occupational
classification.
Sample of employees with mandatory schooling onlyQualitative differences in
education may arise above all when individuals differ in the subject and qua-
lity of their education, ending up working in different jobs. This may result in
different wages for individuals having equal years of education and experience.
Furthermore, differences in the quantity and quality of unmeasured formal
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training add to the problem. These problems are minimised by restricting the
sample to employees who followed mandatory schooling only, because this
education is of quite comparable quality across Switzerland and formal training
of these employees is shown to be rather low (e.g., see Bundesamt für Statis-
tik, 1998). It is important to note, however, that the measure of co-workers’
education still takes into account the education of all employees.
Within this restricted sample equation (3) of Model 3a is reestimated. The
results shown in the first column of Table 6 confirm that education spill-over
effects within occupational groups arise also for this homogenous group of
lowest skilled workers. The estimated spill-over effect (0.024 log points or
around 2% per year of co-workers education) is, however, only half the size of
the effect found for the overall sample (0.041 log points or around 4%). This
may either indicate that a part of the effect for the whole sample reflects unmea-
sured differences in human capital or that the external effects are a function of
the skill level. This could be the case if low-skilled workers get less training by
co-workers, or their co-workers care less about the organisation of their work,
or the lowest skilled are less capable of learning from their co-workers and their
organisation of the work.
Correcting thewage impact of the characteristic ‘no-coworkers in the occupa-
tional group’ (0.294 log points) for the impact of co-workers’ average education
years within occupational groups (0.249=10.4×0.024), a premia of 0.0444 log
points of the average wage of employees of the mandatory schooling level
results. The “solitary worker premia” thus almost vanishes when only the sub-
sample of the lowest educated is looked at. This confirms our earlier expec-
tations that the wage premia of this subgroup estimated in the total sample is
Table 6 Education spill-over effects within occupational groups—employees with mandatory
schooling only
Estimation model: 3a Total sample Tenure up Tenure higher
Dependent variable: log hourly wage to 2 years than 2 years
Co-workers’ years of education in occupational 0.024∗∗ 0.003 0.026∗∗
group, average (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
No. co-workers in occupational group, dummy 0.294∗∗ 0.103 0.308∗∗
(0.014) (0.057) (0.015)
Number of observations (employees) 68,360 7,614 60,746
Number of observations (firms) 3,146 1,303 2,967
R-squared (within) 0.290 0.165 0.297
Coefficients denoted by ** resp. * are significant at 1 resp. 5 % level. The results from within firm
wage estimation are shown, see Sect. 3 for a detailed description
All estimation models include furthermore as individual variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure
squared, dummies for service or unclassified occupation, foreigner, women, part-time workers,
additional dummies for individuals with missing information and for individuals with missing infor-
mation for their own or co-workers’ education or their activity besides the firm fixed effects. The
wage structure of men and women is supposed identical
Source: LSE(1996)
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not determined by the lowest educated employees but rather by the “profes-
sional experts” in some occupational groups at higher educational levels. The
explanatory power of this specification, measured by the relevant R-square, is
around 30%, which we consider satisfactory. The assumption of the equality of
employer-specific fixed effects is also rejected for this restricted sample.
Impact of tenure In a second step, we look at the interaction of these eduction
spill-overs with tenure within the same homogenous group of lowest skilled
workers. The idea is that if these effects were to be explained by a systematic
sorting processwithin firmsbyunmeasured individual characteristics, the tenure
of the workers at a firm should help capture them. The underlying assumption
is that a reasonable period of time (1–2 years at most) since the beginning of
a job spell should be sufficient for an employer to detect the true productivity
of an employee. On the other hand, if educational spill-over effects are found
to arise later during a job spell with an employer, and furthermore if they are
positively correlated with tenure, then the evidence speaks against unobserved
individual heterogeneity affecting the results.
If external effects of education indeed seem to rise over time, as measured
by their correlation with tenure, this speaks in favour of the explanation that
learning from co-workers or the work organisation is enhanced by the high
educational level of co-workers. But we still can not totally exclude other com-
peting explanations. For instance, such a result may also reflect a rather slow
matching process of employees, co-workers and jobs, where the quality of the
matches are determined by unknown and random job and personal (indivi-
dual’s and co-workers’) characteristics. In this process the wage gains from this
matching process can be expected to increase with the complexity of the work
approximated by the human capital intensity of the occupational group. In any
case, nevertheless, these estimations give a first hint at the dynamics behind
these effects.
Thus, in a next step, we split the sample of employees with mandatory schoo-
ling according to their length of tenure. The empirical results are shown in
Table 8. Most strikingly, no education spill-over effects are detected in the
sub-sample of employees with less than two years of tenure (second column).
Contrary to that, significant effects are found for employees havingmore tenure
than two years. Additional tests, not shown in Table 6 but available from the
author upon request, showed that this effect is not simply caused by the larger
sample size of the group of employees with tenure higher than two years. Res-
tricting the sample to individuals with tenure up to only six years shows some
evidence for external effects of education, but which are only one third of the
figure estimated for individuals with medium or high levels of tenure (more
than six years). Hence, education spill-over effects within occupational group
clearly appear to be related to tenure. This finding speaks against the hypo-
thesis of a systematic screening of more able individuals into such high skilled
occupational groups from the beginning of a job spell as standard competitive
labour market theory would suggest. An employment spell of minimum two
years seems to be too long for simply detecting the true ability of a worker
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with low educational attainment level in the case of information problems.
These results, furthermore, are consistent with earlier tests for external effects
of education at employer level, modelling explicitly the impact of unobserved
individual heterogeneity, as shown by Barth (2000).17
The finding that education spill-over effects arise predominantly in a sample
of the stable workforce of the firm is, however, compatible with a rather slow
matching process, which is more rewarding for an employee, the higher the
educational level of his/her co-workers. A more precise determination of this
matching or transmission mechanism of external effects of education is a topic
for further research.
Impact of additional occupational controls The previous estimations showed
that the estimate of education spill-over effects for the lower educated are
substantially lower (2%) than the estimate for the total sample (4%). So far it
is unclear whether this difference is due to the fact that these external effects of
education are indeed higher for employees with higher education or whether
other unmeasured factors account for it. In order to test this, we add in a last step
more detailed controls (23 dummies) for the occupational groups in Model 3.
These dummies capture wage differentials by occupational groups over and
above the effect linked to the educational level of the co-workers within this
group.More precisely, these controls will cancel some differences in individual’s
education (e.g., concerning the professional orientation) and in unmeasured
characteristics like personal preferences for a given occupation. Similarly, they
also control for the impact of a possible labour market segmentation along
occupational lines.
In the first two column of Table 7, we see that adding these controls lowers
the estimate of education spill-overs within occupational groups from 0.041 to
0.016 log points. This points to a significant impact on the result of unmeasured
factors correlated with occupations. Most surprisingly, the education spill-overs
measured at the firm level increase at the same time from 0.020 to 0.060 log
points. This result needs further investigation, but if confirmed it would indicate
that our previous estimates tend to be at the lower bound. The estimate for
corrected private returns to education is still around 0.050 log points or 5%,
surprisingly little affected by the additional occupational controls.
5.2.3 Imperfect substitution between high and low educated workers
In a last step, we try to clarify whether imperfect substitution between high
and low skilled workers as suggested by a conventional demand and supply
model explains the correlation of co-workers education and an individual’s
wage instead of external effects of education. We do this by estimating educa-
tion spill-over effects within occupational groups separately by the three main
17 However, our results seem to contradict the conclusions of Destré et al. (2001) which found
evidence for the largest share of such learning effects on wages arise shortly after being hired. These
substantial differences in the modelling of the external effects of education, albeit, do not allow a
precise comparison of the results.
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Table 7 Education spill-over effects within occupational groups—additional controls for sorting
Estimation model: 3a
Dependent variable: log hourly wage W/B
Number of occupational controls 2 23
Employee’s years of education, both gender 0.052∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Co-workers’ years of education in occupational 0.041∗∗ 0.016∗∗
group, average (0.000) (0.000)
No co-workers in occupational group, dummy 0.604∗∗ 0.233∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Average years of education in firm, both gender 0.020∗∗ 0.060∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Number of observations (employees) 408,008 408,008
Number of observations (firms) 6,753 6,753
R-squared (within) 0.482 0.520
R-squared (between) 0.550 0.622
F-test for firm fixed-effects 30.7 26.2
Coefficients denoted by ** are significant at 1% level.W/B indicates within and between estimation
results from two-step estimation described in Sect. 3
The estimationmodel includes furthermore as individual variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure
squared, foreigner, women, part-time workers, additional dummies for individuals with missing
information and for individuals with missing information for their own or co-workers’ education
or their activity and firm level controls for seven regions, seven industries and firm size. The wage
structure of men and women is supposed identical
Source: LSE(1996)
educational levels for both the original and the enlarged specification (2 or 23
occupational controls). Thesemain educational levels aremandatory schooling,
vocational education of the secondary level, and university education. For these
restricted samples, only the within-firm estimation is done, as this is the main
focus of our study.
The results, shown in Table 8 present a very interesting picture. Clearly, the
impact of co-workers’ education within occupational groups is at least as high
for secondary and tertiary education as for mandatory schooling. The impact is
higher when the heterogeneity in earnings by occupational group is not taken
out with the more detailed set of dummies. These results suggest that, as a
lower bound, education spill-over effects within occupational groups amount
to 0.017–0.025 log points or around 2% for all levels of education. If there
are effects due to the imperfect substitution of high and low skilled workers,
these are small and largely offset by these spill-over effects. In other words, this
result is compatible with the idea that all employees become more productive
when working with higher educated individuals through learning processes
between them. The evidence does not confirm the idea that this effect simply
reflects the fact that the less educated receive a higher wage when working for
more educated and thus more productive individuals in the same occupational
group than when they work for less educated co-workers. This result stands
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Table 8 Education spill-over effects within occupational groups—by educational level
Estimation model: 3a Mandatory Vocational University
Dependent variable: log hourlywage schooling education degree degree
Number of occupational controls 2 23 2 23 2 23
Co-workers’ years of education 0.024∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.023∗∗
in occupational group, average (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
No. co-workers in occupational 0.294∗∗ 0.204∗∗ 0.742∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.885∗∗ 0.339∗∗
group, dummy (0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.038)
Number of observations
(employees)
68,360 68,360 173,953 173,953 16,509 16,509
Number of observations (firms) 3,146 3,146 5,946 5,946 1,444 1,444
R-squared (within) 0.290 0.357 0.437 0.478 0.452 0.525
R-squared (between) – – – – – –
F-test for firm fixed-effects 20.1 18.5 13.8 11.8 9.9 10.7
Coefficients denoted by ** are significant at 1% level. The results from within firm wage estimation
are shown, see Sect. 3 for a detailed description
The estimationmodel includes furthermore as individual variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure
squared, dummies for service or unclassified occupation, foreigner, women, part-time workers,
additional dummies for individuals with missing information and for individuals with missing infor-
mation for their co-workers’ education or their activity and firm level controls for seven regions,
seven industries and firm size. The wage structure of men and women is supposed identical
Source: LSE(1996)
in contradiction to the results of Moretti (2004a) looking at data at city level.
However, the results are also quite consistent with the idea that the higher
educated benefit in fact more from education spill-overs due to their higher
learning capacities. However, a precise determination of the respective size of
the spill-over and substitution effects has to be left to further research.
Again the coefficient of the dummy for no-coworkers in the occupational
group is strongly reduced after introducing additional occupational controls,
from 0.604 to 0.233 log points in the total sample. This impact increases even
more with the educational level, confirming thereby our initial assumptions that
the selection process in such expert positions is not random and in particular
correlated with occupations related to the management of the firm.
Hence, we find clear evidence for education spill-over effects within occu-
pational groups. A lower bound for our estimate of these effects is around
2%, being remarkably similar to the estimate of education spill-over effects
at firm level (2%). Private returns to education corrected for the impact of
such effects are at around 5% substantially lower then the uncorrected returns
at around 7%. This confirms our a priori expectation that conventionally
calculated private returns are biased upwards.
6 Conclusions
In this study, we have attempted to identify the effects of education spill-over
effects from an individual’s co-workers on the conventional estimates of his/her
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private returns to education. Our results show clear evidence for such spill-over
effects within occupational groups (around 2%) over and above the general
firm level effects of similar size. These results have been tested to be robust
to extensive controls for the quality of workers and their education. Further
research based on panel data is needed to test whether these results based on
cross-sectional data really show a true causal relationship. Nevertheless, the
empirical evidence so far strongly hints at external effects of education arising
within the stable workforce of a firm. Employees frequently changing their
employer, on the contrary, seem not to be able to reap the benefits from their
co-workers’ education on their own wages.
Moreover, the results clearly speak against alternative explanations based
on imperfect substitution between high and low educated workers yielding a
similar impact on the wages of the low skilled. Contrary to this explanation,
education spill-over effects were found to be at least as high for workers with
secondary and tertiary education than for workers with mandatory schooling
only.
Due to these education spill-over effects and the fact that more educated
people segregate themselves to employers and into occupational groups with a
higher average education, conventionally calculated private returns to educa-
tion are shown to be biased upwards. We find a lower bound of purely private
returns to education of 5% as compared to 7% calculated by conventional
methods.
These results emphasise the need for microeconomic theory to take external
effects of education into account. Moreover, they clearly strengthen the case
for public subsidies for education, as such externalities risk leading to an under-
production of human capital. More specifically, the results highlight the benefit
of policies aiming at upgrading workers within the labour market.
Appendix
Table 9 Standard wage regression—detailed results
Estimation model: 1a Weighted least squares
Dependent variable: log hourly wage Coef. Std. Error t-value
Years of education 0.071 (0.001) 111.53∗∗
Foreign or missing education 0.765 (0.008) 95.80∗∗
Age 0.044 (0.001) 62.63∗∗
Age squared/100 −0.045 (0.001) −51.93∗∗
Tenure 0.008 (0.000) 21.20∗∗
Tenure squared/100 −0.007 (0.001) −5.87∗∗
Manufacturing activity
Service activity 0.105 (0.003) 39.61∗∗
Other activity 0.065 (0.005) 11.95∗∗
Activity information missing 0.098 (0.004) 24.26∗∗
Swiss nationality
Foreign nationality −0.067 (0.002) −29.08∗∗
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Table 9 continued
Estimation model: 1a Weighted least squares
Dependent variable: log hourly wage Coef. Std. Error t-value
Working part-time −0.059 (0.003) −18.54∗∗
Woman −0.179 (0.003) −70.58∗∗
Lake of Geneva districts −0.081 (0.004) −20.73∗∗
Bern, neighbouring districts −0.094 (0.003) −27.30∗∗
Bale, neighbouring districts −0.104 (0.003) −32.64∗∗
Zurich
Eastern districts −0.054 (0.003) −17.98∗∗
Central montain districts −0.133 (0.003) −39.11∗∗
Southern district (Italian speaking) −0.104 (0.006) −17.68∗∗
Horticulture, without agriculture −0.064 (0.004) −14.26∗∗
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.028 (0.003) −8.04∗∗
Construction −0.003 (0.004) −0.79
Manufacturing
Trade, repair, hotels and restaurants −0.108 (0.003) −32.90∗∗
Transport, communication −0.049 (0.008) −6.55∗∗
Financial intermediation 0.041 (0.005) 8.96∗∗
Private households, extraterrit. org. 0.037 (0.004) 8.33∗∗
Log establishment size 0.013 (0.001) 24.54∗∗
Establishment size missing 0.013 (0.004) 3.00∗∗
Constant 1.560 (0.015) 103.34∗∗
Number of observations (employees) 408,008
R-squared (standard) 0.526
Source: LSE(1996)
Table 10 Education years by educational level
Level Classification labels Years assigned
German English Men Women
1 Nicht schweizerische
Ausbildungsgaenge
Foreign education – –
2 Obligatorische Schulbildung Mandatory schooling 9.0 9.0
3 Unternehmensinterne Berufsausbildung Vocational education,
no recognised degree
10.5 10.5
4 Abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung Vocational education,
recognised degree
12.5 12.0
5 Matura, Berufsmaturitaet High school degree 13.0 13.0
6 Lehrerpatent Teachers’ education 14.0 13.5
7 Hoehere Berufsausbildung Higher professional
schooling
14.5 14.0
8 Hoehere Fachschule/
Fachhochschule
Vocational tertiary
education
15.5 15.0
9 Universitaets-,
Hochschulausbildung
University 18.0 18.0
Source: Weber (1998)
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Table 11 Aggregate classification
Level Classification label (aggregate) Levels of original classification
1 Foreign education, MEI 1 or missing information on education
2 Mandatory schooling 2, 3
3 Vocational education degree 4
4 Upper secondary 5, 6, 7
5 University 8, 9
Source: Weber (1998)
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